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Subverting Massive MIMO by Smart Jamming
Hessam Pirzadeh, S. Mohammad Razavizadeh, and Emil Bjo¨rnson
Abstract—We consider uplink transmission of a massive multi-
user multiple-input multiple-output (MU-MIMO) system in the
presence of a smart jammer. The jammer aims to degrade the
sum spectral efficiency of the legitimate system by attacking both
the training and data transmission phases. First, we derive a
closed-form expression for the sum spectral efficiency by taking
into account the presence of a smart jammer. Then, we determine
how a jammer with a given energy budget should attack the
training and data transmission phases to induce the maximum
loss to the sum spectral efficiency. Numerical results illustrate
the impact of optimal jamming specifically in the large limit of
the number of base station (BS) antennas.
Index Terms—Massive MIMO, jamming, spectral efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
JAMMING constitutes a critical problem for reliability inwireless communications and imposes detrimental impact
on the performance of wireless systems. In recent years, the
performance of wireless systems in the presence of jamming
has been studied extensively from a communication theoretic
perspective. The problem of jammer design in a training-based
point-to-point MIMO system and a multi-user system with a
single antenna BS is analyzed in [1] and [2], respectively. In
addition, the design of a full-duplex eavesdropper (jammer)
based on pilot contamination attack is considered in [3].
Recently, massive MIMO systems have attracted lots of
attention. The ability to increase the spectral efficiency (SE)
along with improving the energy efficiency have made the
technology one of the main candidates for next generation
wireless networks [4]-[5]. In spite of the great amount of
research regarding massive MU-MIMO systems, there are still
only a few works in this area that have adopted physical
layer security (PLS) issues into their analyses. However, the
revisiting of PLS seems to be necessary in massive MIMO
systems. It is recognized that massive MIMO brings new
challenges and opportunities in this area which is unique and
thoroughly different from conventional MIMO systems [6],
[7]. Secure transmission in the downlink of a massive MIMO
system in the presence of an adversary which is capable
of both jamming and eavesdropping is analysed in [6], the
problem of active and passive eavesdropping is studied in [7],
and secrecy enhancement in the downlink of a massive MIMO
system in the presence of eavesdropper(s) is considered in [8]-
[10]. Nevertheless, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, no
study has been done on analyzing the massive MU-MIMO
system’s performance (in terms of sum SE) in the presence of
a jammer. In this paper, we investigate the design of a smart
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jammer in the uplink of a single-cell massive MU-MIMO
system and study the effect of the jamming on the performance
of the system. To design a smart jammer, by adopting classical
bounding techniques, we derive a closed-form expression for
the sum SE of the massive MU-MIMO systems in the presence
of a smart jammer. Then, we find the optimal strategy that a
jammer with a given energy budget should employ to induce
the maximum loss to the sum SE of a legitimate massive MU-
MIMO system. Analytical and numerical analyses show that to
what extent the abundance of antenna elements at the BS can
increase the susceptibility of the massive MU-MIMO systems
to the jamming attack. It is also shown that the advantage
of optimal jamming over fixed power jamming boosts as the
number of BS antennas goes large.
Notations: We use boldface to denote matrices and vectors.
(.)∗, (.)T , (.)H and (.)⋆ denotes conjugate, transpose, conju-
gate transpose, and optimal value, respectively. v ∼ CN (0,R)
denotes circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) ran-
dom vector with zero mean and covariance matrix R. ‖.‖
denotes Euclidean norm. IK is the K × K identity matrix
and expectation operator is denoted by E{.}.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the uplink of a single-cell MU-MIMO system
consisting of K legitimate, single-antenna users (hereafter
users) that send their signals simultaneously to a BS equipped
with M antennas. Also there is a jammer which aims to reduce
the sum SE of the legitimate system by carefully attacking the
training and data transmission phases. Accordingly, the M×1
received signal at the BS is
y =
√
pGx+ n+
√
qgws, (1)
where p represents the average transmission power from each
user, G = HD
1
2 is the channel matrix where H ∈ CM×K
models fast fading with each element, hmk, distributed in-
dependently as CN (0, 1) and D ∈ RK×K is a constant
diagonal matrix whose kth diagonal element, βk, models the
geometric attenuation and shadow-fading between the kth user
and the BS. x ∈ CK×1 is the symbol vector transmitted from
users and is drawn from a CSCG codebook which satisfies
E{xxH} = IK , and n ∼ CN (0, IM ) denotes additive
CSCG receiver noise at the BS. In addition, q represents the
jammer’s average power and gw ∼ CN (0, βwIM ) is the
channel vector between the jammer and the BS. Finally, s
denotes the jammer’s symbol where E{|s|2} = 1.
We consider a block-fading model where each channel
remains constant in a coherence interval of length T symbols
and changes independently between different intervals. Note
that T is a fixed system parameter chosen as the minimum
coherence duration of all users and is assumed to be smaller
2than that of the jammer. At the beginning of each coherence
interval, the users send their η-tuple mutually orthogonal pilot
sequences (K ≤ η ≤ T ) to the BS for channel estimation.
The remaining T − η symbols are dedicated to uplink data
transmission. The average transmission powers of the users
during training and data transmission phases are denoted by
pt and pd, respectively.
In order to analyze the worst-case impact of jamming, we
assume that the jammer is aware of the transmission protocol
and can potentially use different powers for jamming the
training and data transmission phases [1], [11], which are
denoted by qt and qd, respectively.
A. Training Phase
The pilot sequences can be stacked into an η ×K matrix√
ηptΦ, where the kth column of Φ, φk, is the kth user’s pilot
sequence and ΦHΦ = IK1. Therefore, the M × η received
signal at the BS is
Y t =
√
ηptGΦ
T +N +
√
ηqtgwφ
T
w, (2)
where N is an M × η matrix with i.i.d. CN (0, 1) elements,
and φw is the jammer’s pilot sequence2. The minimum mean
squared error (MMSE) estimate [12] of G given Y t is
Gˆ =
1√
ηpt
Y tΦ
∗
(
IK +
1 + qtβw
ηpt
D−1
)−1
. (3)
Define E , Gˆ−G. Then we have
σ2gˆk =
ηptβ
2
k
ηptβk + qtβw + 1
and σ2εk =
(1 + qtβw)βk
ηptβk + qtβw + 1
(4)
where σ2gˆk and σ
2
εk
are the variances of the independent zero-
mean elements in the kth column of Gˆ and E , respectively.
B. Data Transmission Phase
In this phase, the users send their data to the BS simulta-
neously while the jammer is sending its artificial noise signal.
The BS selects a linear detection matrix A ∈ CM×K as a
function of the channel estimate Gˆ. Therefore, the resulted
signal at the BS is [4]
r = AH (
√
pdGx+ n+
√
qdgws) . (5)
The kth element of r is
rk =
√
pda
H
k gkxk
+
√
pd
K∑
i=1,i6=k
aHk gixi + a
H
k n+
√
qda
H
k gws, (6)
where ak and gk are the kth columns of A and G, respec-
tively. The BS treats aHk gk as the desired channel and the last
three terms of (6) as worst-case Gaussian noise when decoding
1We assume that the legitimate system changes Φ randomly in different
coherence intervals and, hence, the jammer is unable to know the users’ pilot
sequences during training phase [6].
2Since the jammer does not know the users’ pilot sequences, it chooses
a random pilot sequence uniformly distributed over the unit sphere, i.e.,
E
{
‖φw‖
2
}
= 1, to contaminate pilot sequences of the users [4]. As a
result E
{
|φTwφ
∗
k
|2
}
= 1/η.
the signal3. Consequently, an ergodic achievable SE at the kth
user is [13]
Sk = C (SINRk) , (7)
where C (γ) , (1− η/T ) log2 (1 + γ) and SINRk is the
effective signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio at the kth user
given by (8) shown at the top of the next page [13].
C. Sum Spectral Efficiency
In our analyses, we choose the sum SE (in bit/s/Hz) as our
objective function which is defined as S , ∑Kk=1 Sk [13].
By using (4) and (8) and assuming maximum ratio combining
(MRC) at the BS4 (i.e., A = Gˆ) [4], a closed-form expression
for the sum SE in the presence of a smart jammer can be
derived as (9) at the top of the next page. From equation (9)
it is apparent that, as the number of BS antennas M goes to
infinity, jamming saturates the performance of the legitimate
system due to pilot contamination. More precisely
S −−−−→
M→∞
K∑
k=1
C
(
η
pt
qt
pd
qd
(
βk
βw
)2)
. (10)
In Section IV, we show that optimal jamming can accelerate
the pace of this saturation notably.
Furthermore, we consider energy constrained transmission
in each coherence block for both users and the jammer. This
energy constraint could be interpreted as a constraint on the
power budget during the coherence interval [1]. The power
budget of each user and the jammer are denoted by P and Q,
respectively. Hence, for each user we have
ηpt + (T − η)pd = PT, (11)
and for the jammer we have
ηqt + (T − η)qd = QT. (12)
We denote the fraction of the total energy that each user
and the jammer allocate to the training phase by ϕ and ζ,
respectively [1]. Accordingly, for each user we have
pt =
ϕPT
η
and pd =
(1− ϕ)PT
T − η , (13)
and for the jammer we have
qt =
ζQT
η
and qd =
(1− ζ)QT
T − η . (14)
In the next section, we derive the optimal value of ζ that
minimizes the sum SE.
3The jammer transmits Gaussian signal during data transmission phase,
since it induces the worst-case interference in this phase.
4Note that the main results do not rely on the assumption of MRC detector
and similar ones occur for zero-forcing (ZF) and MMSE detectors.
3SINRk =
pd|E
{
aHk gk
} |2
pd
∑K
i=1 E
{|aHk gi|2}− pd|E{aHk gk} |2 + E {‖ak‖2}+ qdE{|aHk gw|2} (8)
S =
K∑
k=1
C

 Mηptβ2k
(ηptβk + qtβw + 1)
(∑K
i=1 βi +
1
pd
)
+ ηptβ2k +
qd
pd
((M + 2) qtβw + ηptβk + 1)βw

 (9)
III. OPTIMAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION
In this section, we show how a smart jammer with a given
energy budget should attack the training and data transmission
phases to subvert the performance of a massive MU-MIMO
system. Since the users have a fixed strategy during uplink
transmission, we assume that the smart jammer can acquire
the value of ϕ and P to facilitate its design and impose the
maximum loss to the sum SE of the legitimate system [1], [2].
Thus, the optimization problem for deriving the optimal value
of ζ is
P :
{
minimize
ζ
S
subject to 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1.
(15)
The next proposition helps us to solve this optimization
problem efficiently.
Proposition 1. P is a convex optimization problem.
Proof: By substituting (14) into (9), P can be written as
P :


minimize
ζ
(
1− η
T
) K∑
k=1
log2
(
1 +
1
fk (ζ)
)
subject to 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1.
(16)
In this formulation, fk (ζ) , α(ζ)Mηptβ2k where
α (ζ) ,
(
ηptβk +
ζβwQT
η
+ 1
)( K∑
i=1
βi +
1
pd
)
+
(1− ζ) βwQT
(T − η) pd
(
(M + 2)
ζβwQT
η
+ ηptβk + 1
)
+ηptβ
2
k.
(17)
The second derivative of fk (ζ) is equal to
∂2fk (ζ)
∂ζ2
= − 2(M + 2)β
2
wQ2T 2
Mη2ptpdβ2k (T − η)
< 0. (18)
Hence, fk (ζ) is a concave function. Since log2
(
1 + 1
x
)
is
convex and non-increasing function, and from the concavity of
fk (ζ), we conclude that log2(1 + 1fk(ζ) ) is a convex function
of ζ [14]. Since also the summation of convex functions is
convex, the proof is complete.
As a result, we can find the optimal jammer energy alloca-
tion ratio ζ⋆ by any convex optimization tool. In Section IV we
evaluate ζ⋆ numerically for different values of the jammer’s
power budget and the number of BS antennas.
To get an insight into the impact of the number of BS
antennas on ζ⋆, we can obtain a closed-form solution for P
in the special case of D = βIK . Using Lagrangian multiplier
method and Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [14], the
optimal energy allocation ratio can be derived analytically as
ζ⋆ =


0, QT < −κ,
1, QT < κ,
κ+QT
2QT , otherwise,
(19)
where
κ =
(Kβ (1− ϕ)PT + T − η)− η (βϕPT + 1)
βw (M + 2)
.
This analytical expression demonstrates that the jammer’s
optimal strategy is dependent on the number of BS antennas.
For instance, as the number of BS antennas grows, κ becomes
smaller. Consequently, the optimal jamming strategy, even for
a low power jammer, falls into the third case, i.e., attacking
both phases. Specifically, as the number of BS antennas goes to
infinity, κ tends to zero and the optimal energy allocation ratio
tends to ζ⋆ = 1/2. This result seems logical since by attacking
both phases, the jammer can amplify its adverse impact on the
system’s performance proportional to M by the aid of pilot
contamination. It can also be shown from (19) that ζ⋆ is a
continuous and non-increasing function of the users’ energy
allocation ratio ϕ. Hence, the more energy the users devote to
the training phase, the more energy the jammer should employ
to jam the data transmission phase.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We consider a cell with radius rc = 1000 m in which
K = 10 users are uniformly distributed and no user is closer
than rh = 200 m to the BS. We set βk = zk/(rk/rh)ν , where
zk is a log-normal random variable with standard deviation
σsh = 8 dB that models shadow-fading, rk is the distance
between the BS and the kth user and ν = 3.8 is the decay
exponent. Also we set T = 200. It is assumed that the users
have optimized their energy allocation ratio ϕ and training
duration η to maximize the sum SE as described in [15], [16].
Note that owing to the normalization of the noise variance
to one, P and Q are “normalized” power and, therefore,
dimensionless. Accordingly, they are measured in dB in the
numerical evaluations.
In Fig. 1 the smart jamming benefit for different values of
the jammer’s power budget is depicted. We compare the opti-
mal jamming (i.e., ζ⋆) to the equal jamming (i.e., ζ = η/T ) for
a BS with M = 100 antennas. The sum SE reduction thanks
to optimal energy allocation is significant which approves the
potential of smart jamming in the massive MIMO systems.
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Fig. 1. Sum spectral efficiency S versus the jammer’s power budget Q for a
BS with M = 100 antennas. The users’ power budget P is set to 0, 10, and
20 dB. The sum spectral efficiency is depicted when the jammer performs
optimal jamming (ζ⋆) and equal jamming (ζ = η/T ).
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Fig. 2. Sum spectral efficiency S versus the number of BS antennas M .
The jammer’s power budget Q is set to be 10 dB, the users’s power budget
P is set to 5, 10, and 15 dB.
Fig. 2 illustrates the advantage of smart jamming in the large
antenna limit. In our experiment, we set the jammer’s power
budget to Q = 10 dB and the legitimate users’ power budget
P to 5, 10, and 15 dB. The divergence between the equal
and optimal jamming curves states that the more antennas
the BS is equipped, the more harm could be induced to the
sum SE by optimal jamming compared to equal jamming.
We could also conjecture this phenomenon intuitively. In fact,
as the number of BS antennas increases, the adverse impact
of the jammer on the sum SE magnifies due to the pilot
contamination phenomenon. As a result, the jammer plays the
role of a high power jammer which is a scenario that optimal
jamming outperforms equal jamming significantly. Moreover,
It is evident that optimal jamming saturates the sum SE faster
than equal jamming as the number of BS antennas goes large.
Fig. 3 shows the impact of the number of BS antennas
M and the users’ energy allocation ratio ϕ on the jammer’s
optimal energy allocation ratio ζ⋆. It demonstrates that, when
the number of BS antennas is small, the jammer’s optimal en-
ergy allocation ratio decreases as the users’ energy allocation
ratio increases. For instance, when M = 10 and ϕ = 0.1,
the jammer should allocate more energy for the jamming of
the training phase. The reverse holds true for ϕ = 0.9, i.e.,
the jammer should allocate more energy to jam of the data
transmission phase. Apart from the dependence of ζ⋆ on ϕ,
the optimal strategy is equal energy allocation (i.e., ζ⋆ = 0.5)
as the number of BS antennas goes large. These observations
are consistent with the analytical results in Section III.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we considered the problem of smart jamming
in the uplink of a massive MU-MIMO system. We showed that
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Fig. 3. Optimal energy allocation ratio ζ⋆ versus the number of BS antennas
M for different values of ϕ. The jammer’s power budget Q and the users’s
power budget P is set to be 10 dB.
if a jammer causes pilot contamination during training phase
and optimally allocates its power budget to jam the training
and data transmission phases, it can impose dramatic harm to
the sum SE of the legitimate system. Analytical results showed
that the optimal strategy of a smart jammer is highly dependent
on the number of BS antennas. In particular, when the BS is
equipped with large number of antenna elements, even a low
power jammer can achieve a large gain by optimal energy
allocation over fixed power jamming.
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